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1 Facts of the Case
In United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products
from the European Communities (WTO Doc. WT/DS212/QB/R, hence-
forth Certain Products), the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade
Organization was called upon to revisit the issue of whether the United
States can legally impose countervailing duties following the privatization
of state-owned enterprises that had received non-recurring subsidies. In
twelve cases, the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) had
applied either the ‘‘gamma method’’ or the ‘‘same-person method’’ in
assessing the impact of a change of ownership on the continued existence
of a benefit from a countervailable subsidy. The European Communities
challenged the legality of these methods.
Under the gamma method, the USDOC applied an ‘‘irrebuttable pre-
sumption’’ that the benefits from a non-recurring subsidy remain in
existence for the entire useful life of the assets purchased with benefit of
* We are grateful to Henrik Horn, Doug Irwin, Arun Venkataraman and Jasper-Martijn
Wauters for helpful discussions on the issue treated in this report.
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a subsidy. The USDOCdid not undertake any inquiry into whether and to
what extent a non-recurring subsidy continued to benefit the producers
during the useful life of the assets. Rather, when confronted with a change
of ownership, the USDOC simply allocated the subsidy benefit between
seller and purchaser to match the fraction of the assets that had been
transferred.
Following the AB ruling in United States – Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products
Originating in the United Kingdom, (WTODoc.WT/DS138/AB/R, hence-
forth Lead and Bismuth) that the gamma method is inconsistent with
US obligations under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (the SCM Agreement), the United States introduced the new,
same-person method. Under this method, the USDOC conducts a two-
step test to assess the continued existence of a benefit from prior sub-
sidization. First, the agency decides whether the post-privatization entity
is the ‘‘same legal person’’ as that which received the subsidy prior to
privatization. To render this assessment, the USDOC considers whether
there has been a continuity of general business operations, a continuity of
production facilities, a continuity of assets and liabilities, and a retention
of personnel. If, based on these criteria, the USDOC concludes that the
privatization created no new legal person, it automatically concludes that
the benefit from the subsidy still exists irrespective of the price paid by
the new private owners for the assets of the state-owned enterprise. If the
privatization has created a new legal person, then the benefits of the
original subsidy are considered to have been extinguished.
The USDOC applied the gammamethod in 11 of the 12 cases at issue in
Certain Products. Of these, six were original investigations, one was an
administrative review, and four were sunset reviews. The USDOC applied
the same-personmethod in one case, which was an administrative review.
2 Panel Ruling
The European Communities argued before the WTO Panel that both the
gamma method and the same-person method violate US commitments
under the SCM Agreement to apply countervailing measures only when
the removal of such measures would likely lead to continuation or recur-
rence of subsidization that causes or threatens to cause injury to domestic
interests. Under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy can be
deemed to exist only if a financial contribution by a government confers
a ‘‘benefit’’ on the recipient. The European Communities argued, as it had
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done previously, that a firm cannot benefit when it purchases assets at
arm’s length and for fair-market value. Thus, according to the European
Communities, a privatization of state-owned assets and for fair-market
value creates an irrebuttable presumption that a subsidy no longer exists
and so renders any countervailing measure imposed by another Member
country illegal.
The United States conceded in the case before the Panel that it had
acted in a manner inconsistent with its WTO obligations in seven of the
twelve determinations; namely, those that involved application of the
gamma method in original investigations or administrative review. In
these cases, the United States acknowledged, the USDOC should have
examined the continued existence of a benefit from the non-recurring
subsidy. The United States denied having taken any actions inconsistent
with its commitments in the four cases that involved sunset reviews,
claiming that where no administrative review has taken place, its investi-
gatory authority is under no obligation to consider any evidence when
deciding whether the expiry of a countervailing duty would likely lead to a
continuation or recurrence of subsidization causing injury. Finally, the
United States argued that the same-person method addresses the objec-
tions raised by the AB in its rulings on the gamma method. Using the
same-person method, the United States argued, the USDOC had consid-
ered whether a benefit from a subsidy continued to exist, as required by
Article 21 of the SCM Agreement.
The Panel ruled in favor of the European Communities on both
accounts. Concerning the four sunset reviews in which the USDOC had
applied the gamma method, the Panel ruled that the United States
was indeed obliged in such cases to examine the continued existence of
a benefit. Without doing so, the USDOC could not have properly
considered whether there would likely be continuing or recurring sub-
sidization that would cause or threaten to cause injury absent the counter-
vailing duty.
The Panel further judged the same-person method to be inconsistent
with the SCMAgreement. The Panel in fact concluded that privatization at
arm’s length and for fair-market value will always necessarily extinguish
the remaining portion of any benefit from a prior non-recurring subsidy
paid to a previously existing state-owned enterprise. The Panel’s central
finding is put quite clearly in para. 8.1d of its report, which states in part:
[o]nce an importing member has determined that a privatization has taken
place at arm’s-length and for fair market value, it must reach the conclusion
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that no benefit resulting from the prior financial contribution (or subsidi-
zation) continues to accrue to the privatized producer.
3 US Appeal and AB Ruling
The United States argued on appeal that the Panel had erred by failing to
distinguish between a firm and its shareholders. According to the United
States, a benefit received by a legal person cannot be redeemed by its
shareholders. Thus, if a state-owned enterprise (a legal person) benefits
from a financial contribution and if that same legal person continues to
exist following privatization, then the benefit also continues to exist until
it has been fully amortized or repaid. Privatization at whatever price –
even if at arm’s length and for fair-market value – cannot eliminate the
benefit of a prior contribution as long as the same legal person continues
to exist. By this argument, the fact that private owners pay a fair-market
price indicates only that these individuals have not received a windfall
gain, but not that the legal person producing the subject merchandise is
not still benefiting from the original subsidy.
The United States also appealed the Panel finding that its investigating
authority is obliged to consider whether there is continuing benefit from a
financial contribution whenever it conducts a sunset review, but it failed
to advance supporting arguments on this point.
On the critical issue of whether a privatization at fair-market value
might or must extinguish the benefit from a non-recurring subsidy, the
AB accepted neither the claims advanced by the United States of the total
irrelevance of the price at which assets are transferred, nor the ruling by
the Panel that a sale at a fair-market price creates an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the subsidy has been eliminated. In so doing, the AB
reversed the position it had taken in Lead and Bismuth that privatization
at fair-market prices inevitably extinguishes the benefit from a prior
government contribution.
In its report, the AB drew upon its interpretation of the word ‘‘benefit’’
in Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (WTO Doc.
WT/DS70/AB/R). There it had ruled that the word implies some kind
of comparison, and that ‘‘the marketplace provides an appropriate basis
for comparison . . . because the trade-distorting potential of a ‘financial
contribution’ can be identified by determining whether the recipient has
received a ‘financial contribution’ on terms more favorable than those
available to the recipient on the market’’ (Certain Products, para. 157).
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Whereas the United States had argued that the utility value of the assets
acquired with the benefit of the government’s financial contribution had
not been eliminated as a result of the transfer of these assets to new private
owners, the AB saw the utility value as irrelevant for the legal purpose of
assessing the continued existence of a ‘‘benefit’’. Rather, the AB insisted
that the marketplace should be used as the starting point for any such
assessment.
The AB rejected entirely the United States’ argument to the effect that
the price at which assets are acquired is irrelevant to a firm’s use of these
assets, and the other decisions it makes subsequent to that acquisition in
regard to the prices and quantities of its production. On this point, the AB
wrote in Certain Products, para. 103, that
[w]e fail to see the basis for the assumption by the United States that,
regardless of the sale price of the firm, its costs and volume of production
will remain the same, since these costs include, as a necessary component,
the cost of capital. Indeed, the Panel noted that private investors are
‘‘profit-maximizers’’, who will seek to ‘‘recoup[] through the privatized
company . . . a market return on the full amount of their investment.’’ For
example, if a government makes a ‘‘financial contribution’’ that ‘‘benefit[s]’’
a state-owned enterprise, and then sells that enterprise for less than its fair
market price, would this not normally result in a ‘‘better off’’ return for the
private capital newly invested in that enterprise? Would that not suggest, as
a consequence, that the under-priced enterprise may then attract more
investment than it would have attracted otherwise, if the government had
sold it for fair market price? Why would this government-induced add-
itional investment not then reduce the enterprise’s cost of raising capital
(either by borrowing it from the bank or from, say, shareholders) and,
ultimately, reduce the firm’s overall costs of production?
However, the AB disagreed with the Panel’s judgment that a benefit from
a prior financial contribution to a state-owned enterprise can never
continue to exist following the privatization of the enterprise’s assets
at arm’s length and for fair-market value. To reach this conclusion,
the AB drew a distinction between the exchange value of goods and
services and their scarcity value. It noted that, ‘‘[u]nder certain conditions
(e.g., unfettered interplay of supply and demand, broad-based access
to information on equal terms, decentralization of economic power,
an effective legal system guaranteeing the existence terms of private
property and the enforcement of contracts), prices will reflect the relative
scarcity of goods and services in themarket’’ (Certain Products, para. 122).
Under these conditions, the AB opined, the ‘‘actual exchange value of
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the continuing benefit of past non-recurring financial contributions
bestowed on the state-owned enterprise will be fairly reflected in the
market price.’’
But the AB noted that it could imagine circumstances in which the
market price of the assets would not reflect ‘‘the exchange value of
the continuing benefit.’’ Such circumstances might arise, for example,
if the government were intervening in the market to induce certain out-
comes that it deemed socially or politically desirable. Then, in the view of
the AB, the value of the assets might be altered by the government policies
or by the conditions in which the private owners would subsequently be
allowed to make use of the assets. When the fair-market value diverges
from the ‘‘actual exchange value of the continuing benefit,’’ an investiga-
tory authority could legitimately find that a benefit of past non-recurring
financial contributions to a state-owned enterprise continues to exist
beyond the time of an arm’s-length privatization. The AB gave no con-
crete example of the sort of situation it had in mind.
In sum, the AB affirmed the Panel’s ruling that the United States had
acted inconsistently with its obligations under the SCM Agreement in the
twelve specific determinations at issue in Certain Products. In so doing,
it ruled that the same standards ought to apply for showing continuing
existence of benefits from financial contributions in sunset reviews as
in original investigations or administrative reviews. However, the AB
overturned the Panel’s finding that privatization at arm’s length and for
fair-market value presumptively extinguishes any benefit from a non-
recurring financial contribution bestowed upon a state-owned enterprise.
Rather, it ruled that whereas such a privatization creates a rebuttable
presumption that a benefit ceases to exist, there may be circumstances in
which an investigatory authority can find otherwise.
4 Discussion of the AB Ruling
In our report last year on Lead and Bismuth, we concluded in relevant part
that1
The AB ruled incorrectly that a change in ownership of assets at fair market
value provides per se evidence of an absence of subsidy, because it precludes
‘benefit’ to the acquiring firm. A consistent interpretation of the SCM
1 SeeGeneM.Grossman and Petros C.Mavroidis, ‘‘Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization
and the Injury Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies,’’ in Grossman and Mavroidis (2003).
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Agreement calls for a ‘but for’ test for continuing injury from a non-recur-
ring subsidy. The authorities in the importing country should periodically
review whether its domestic producers of like products are suffering harm
relative to what would be their economic condition but for the prior non-
recurring subsidy. To effect this test, the authorities must ask whether or
not the subsidized investments have become infra-marginal in the light of
subsequent events in the industry
(p. 34).
In Certain Products, the AB has reversed its position that a change in
ownership at fair-market prices provides per se evidence of the absence of
subsidy. We concur on this issue. However, we find fault with the reason-
ing used by the AB in reaching this conclusion. And we disagree with its
finding that a change in ownership at fair-market prices provides a
rebuttable presumption that a subsidy no longer exists.
By insisting that the sales price at which a privatization takes place is
relevant to the determination of the continued existence of benefit from a
subsidy, the AB has failed to understand the economic concept of a sunk
cost. The United States is correct when it argues that the price at which a
profit-maximizing enterprise acquires an asset will not affect its subse-
quent production and pricing decisions. The fact that such an enterprise
will wish to ‘‘recoup a market return on its investment’’ is simply irrele-
vant to its subsequent business decisions. Consider, for example, an art
dealer who misjudges the public appeal of a painting and pays e1000 for
an acquisition. Such a dealer may well wish to recoup a market return on
his investment, but if the amount collectors are willing to pay for the
painting is only e500, the dealer would be well advised to sell at that price.
Now compare this dealer to another who has been lucky enough to
acquire a similar painting for e100. If this second dealer is a profit
maximizer, he will not sell the painting for e120 and be satisfied with a
fair-market return on his investment. Instead, he will hold out for the full
e500 that collectors are willing to pay. In short, the dealer who acquires
an asset for e1000 and another who acquires one for e100 – if they are
both profit maximizers – will indeed follow similar pricing strategies.
Once the dealers have purchased the paintings, the amounts they
paid become sunk costs; they have no bearing on subsequent, profit-
maximizing behavior.
Similarly, a firm that acquires assets in a privatization of a state-owned
enterprise will maximize profits by producing up to the point where the
marginal revenue from the last unit of output is just equal to the marginal
cost. Inasmuch as the marginal cost of production is not affected by the
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price paid for machinery and equipment, the profit-maximizing behavior
will not be affected by such bygone considerations.
The logical difficulties that stem from the AB interpretation of the word
‘‘benefit’’ in Art. 1.1 of the SCMAgreement in terms of the market value of
the privatized assets can be seen in a comparison of two hypothetical
occurrences. Imagine a machine that can be used to create e50,000 in
present discounted profits. A private, profit-maximizing firm would be
willing to pay up to e50,000 to acquire such a machine. Let the produc-
tion cost of the machine be e100,000. Then no firm will be willing to buy
the machine absent any government inducement. Now consider Event 1,
in which the government offers a subsidy of e50,000 to any firm willing to
buy and install the machine. Such a subsidy is sufficient to induce one or
more private firms to make the purchase. In the event, and if the machine
is used in a way that causes injury to firms in importing countries, surely
the SCMAgreementwould recognize the existence of a subsidy and permit
a countervailing duty.
But now consider Event 2, in which the government buys the machine
itself in the name of a state-owned enterprise. On the next day, it offers to
privatize the enterprise by selling the firm’s assets to the highest bidder.
The privatization – which occurs at arm’s length – will take place at a fair-
market price of e50,000. But, in this case, the AB would deny the existence
of a subsidy, and deny Member countries the right to countervail. In both
Events, the private firm that eventually makes use of the machine pays
e50,000 for the acquisition. In both cases, the firm uses the machine to
produce profits of e50,000 and, in the process, inflicts injury on firms
in importing countries. In both cases, the government’s net financial
contribution is e50,000. Yet the AB construes a benefit from a financial
contribution in one situation but not the other. It seems unlikely that this
was the intention of those who drafted the SCM Agreement.2
The AB interpretation of ‘‘benefit’’ also creates logical difficulties for
the treatment of non-recurring subsidies paid directly to private enter-
prises.3 The ownership shares of such enterprises turn over regularly in
2 Of course, we cannot be sure that those who drafted the agreement did not intend to
draw a distinction between these economically equivalent events. To assess their
intentions, we must analyze the apparent objectives of the agreement in the light of its
various provisions. We have conducted just such an analysis in Grossman and Mavroidis
(2003), where we concluded that the only interpretation of the text that accords with the
apparent objectives of the agreement is one that associates ‘‘benefit’’ with a gain in
competitive advantage.
3 We are grateful to David Palmeter for this observation.
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transactions on private equity markets. Such sales take place at arm’s
length and for fair-market value. And those who purchase the shares
subsequent to the payment of the subsidy do not personally benefit
from the original subsidy. Does the AB consider a part of the ‘‘benefit’’
to be extinguished with each such private equity sale?
As we argued in Grossman and Mavroidis (2003), the only interpret-
ation of the term ‘‘benefit’’ in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement that is
consistent with the aims and objectives of those who drafted the
Agreement is one that attributes benefit whenever a firm’s competitive
position is advantaged relative to what it would have been but for
the government’s financial contribution. We view the main objective of
the SCM Agreement as being to discourage subsidies that threaten harm
to competing producers in importing countries. To achieve this objective,
it makes no sense to interpret ‘‘benefit’’ in terms of the financial wealth of
the owners of a firm. Rather, the potentially adverse effects of a subsidy on
producers in an importing country can be avoided only if a subsidy is
deemed to exist whenever a government’s financial contribution impacts
the competitive situation in an industry. And, as we have argued, the price
at which a change in ownership takes place has no bearing on the
subsequent competitive conditions.
In Grossman and Mavroidis (2003), we also found fault with the pro-
cedures used by the United States for assessing whether the removal of a
countervailing measure would likely lead to a continuation or recurrence
of subsidization causing injury. Our arguments there – which related to
use of the gamma method – apply with equal force to the same person
method that was subsequently developed by the USDOC. The USmethods
presume that the benefits from a non-recurring subsidy necessarily sur-
vive for the full average useful life of the assets, provided that the legal
person that purchased the assets with benefit of the subsidy continues to
exist. We do not agree. Events that occur subsequent to the payment of a
subsidy may render inframarginal an investment that was formerly
unprofitable. If an investment becomes inframarginal, it is impossible
to argue that the subsidy is the cause of ongoing injury. In such circum-
stances, the injury would be present even if the subsidy had never been
paid. We therefore conclude that the same person method does not fulfill
the United States’ obligation under Article 21.1 of the SCM Agreement to
ensure that
a countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent
necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.
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To fulfill this obligation, the USDOC should conduct a review that
addresses the hypothetical question of what industry conditions would
have been but for the payment of the non-recurring subsidy.
We do concur with the AB ruling that the obligations imposed on an
investigatory authority by the SCM Agreement apply with equal force to
the reviews mandated by Article 21 of the Agreement. The Agreement
defines a countervailable subsidy in terms of the cost to the government,
the benefit to a recipient, and specificity to an enterprise or industry.
Since the existence of a benefit forms part of the definition of a subsidy,
and countervailing duties can be continued only if there is a subsidy that is
causing injury (emphasis added), the obligation to identify a beneficiary
applies not only to the original investigation, but also to subsequent
review proceedings.
5 Conclusions
We believe that privatization at arm’s length and for fair-market value
does not presumptively extinguish the benefits from a non-recurring
subsidy to a state-owned enterprise. Rather, an investigatory authority
should periodically review whether the prior subsidy continues to affect
competitive conditions in such a way as would cause or threaten injury to
a domestic industry in an importing country in the absence of a counter-
vailing duty. The investigatory authority should compare conditions in
the industry to those that would have prevailed but for the subsidy
payments.
As we noted in last year’s report, there is no need to amend the SCM
Agreement in order that it might be applied in an economically-friendly
manner.
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